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József Simon
Shame, Common Wealth and Religion 
in the Thought of Miklós Bethlen 
(1642–1714)1
Introduction
The call for papers of the Third Budapest Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy drew the 
attention of potential participants to “resources from different traditions, both ‘central’ and 
‘peripheral’ ones”. I will discuss “peripheral sources” in relation to my ongoing research, 
concerning which I have rather questions and problems instead of solid and established 
answers. Miklós Bethlen, the hero of this paper, wrote his texts mirroring his philosophi-
cal thoughts on the periphery of institutional conditions of the Early Modern history of 
European philosophy. His name is well-known for scholars of early modern Hungarian 
history (R. Várkonyi 1984, 1999) or early modern Hungarian literature (Ötvös 2013; Tóth 
2012; Förköli 2010; Maráczi 2005; Gömöri 2001; Czigány 1984; Tolnai 1970).2 One can 
say without exaggerating that the whole history of Hungary and Transylvania between 
1660 and 1704 can be described in the form of footnotes to his biography. His main politi-
cal achievement was the so-called Diploma Leopoldinum (1691), which declared the legal 
status of the Principality of Transylvania within the Habsburg Empire after its liberation 
from Ottoman rule (cf. R. Várkonyi 1994). In the course of his negotiations with Kaiser 
Leopold, Bethlen succeeded in achieving guarantees for a much more liberal legal status 
than had previously been expected. The regulations of the Diploma proved to be enduring, 
they remained in place until the revolutionary events of 1848.
1 This research was supported by project nr. EFOP-3.6.2-16-2017-00007, titled Aspects on the develop-
ment of intelligent, sustainable and inclusive society: social, technological, innovation networks in 
employment and digital economy. The project has been supported by the European Union, co-financed 
by the European Social Fund and the budget of Hungary.
2 These references include chiefly contributions in English, German or French. For a more detailed guide 
regarding the research, see Tóth 2016!
168 József Simon
But the protagonist of my paper is Miklós Bethlen, the Philosopher3 (Lacházi 2007, 
2015, 2016; Simon 2016a, 2016b, 2017), who as such remained in the shadow of his role 
played in the local and international scenes of politics. In the present paper I would like 
to introduce some of the philosophical ideas developed in the Foreword of his own Auto-
biography (Élete leírása magától) written in Hungarian in 1708.4 It is more than puzzling 
that the only text which provides us with the possibility to reconstruct his philosophical 
ideas was written in the very late period of his life; Bethlen remained in silence regarding 
philosophical matters until 1708, when after he had been arrested in 1704 accused of high 
treason he was transported from Nagyszeben (today Sibiu, Romania) to Vienna. Along the 
way he was held in prison for two months in May and June 1708 in Eszék (today Osijek, 
Croatia). According to his own account, he composed the Foreword to his Autobiography 
there, while the rest of the manuscript containing the extended narration of his own life 
was produced by him later in his prison in Vienna during the years from 1708 to 1710. The 
available sources of his own life present him as an intellectual of high quality regarding 
practical matters, but we have no sign of the refined philosophical orientation in the docu-
ments preceding the Foreword of the Autobiography.
Bethlen was born in 1642 into one of the most ancient families of Transylvanian high 
nobility. Members of his family played an important role throughout the sixteenth and sev-
enteenth centuries of early modern Transylvania struggling in the political space of power 
between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy, respectively. Bethlen grew 
up in the immediate circle of Transylvanian Princes in the exclusive group of other youths 
with a similar high social background. In the 1650s he attended lectures at the princely 
court in Gyulafehérvár (today Alba Iulia, Romania) given by János Apáczai Csere, who is 
honoured as the first Hungarian Cartesian thinker (Hanák 1990, 29–31). 
In 1661–1663 Bethlen visited the University of Heidelberg in Germany and the Uni-
versities of Utrecht and Leiden in the Low Countries. While in 1659 Bethlen studied un-
der the Ramist-Cartesian Apáczai Csere; shortly after the death of his teacher he attended 
the lectures of the young Samuel Pufendorf in Heidelberg in the early months of 1661.5 
Bethlen mentions his German professor in the usual laconic manner of the Autobiography, 
nevertheless he does not fail to note that Pufendorf lectured on Grotius’s masterwork De 
iure pacis ac belli (Bethlen 1980, 573). One cannot overestimate the striking difference 
in intellectual milieu between Transylvania and Heidelberg: while attending Pufendorf ’s 
lectures, Bethlen must have gained immediate experience of his professor’s most intensive 
dilemmas concerning a priori-mathematical versus historical argumentation for the theory 
3 There is some research concerning Bethlen’s philosophy, however neither Lendvai’s (2001) nor Hanák’s 
(1990) laconic interpretations provide us with insights into the philosophical substance of the Fore-
word in Bethlen’s Autobiography. 
4 Despite all my caveats (cf. Simon 2016b), I refer to Bethlen’s text in the standard edition (1980).
5 See Benrath’s publication of the advertisements of lectures at the University of Heidelberg in 1661 
(Benrath 1961, 95).
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of positive and natural rights, or concerning the removal of moral theology from the realm 
of natural rights (Dreitzel 2001, 779). 
The other scene of his higher education was the Low Countries. Bethlen studied at the 
universities of Utrecht and Leiden between 1661 and 1663. He attended both public and 
private lectures of leading intellectuals belonging either to the philosophical movement 
of Cartesianism (Johannes de Raey, Henricus Regius – if Henry de Roy may be treated 
as Cartesian), or to the theological camp of Cocceianism (Frans Burman, Abraham Hei-
danus and Johannes Cocceius himself). Bethlen acquired his basic cultural identity as 
a Reformed Cartesian in Utrecht and Leiden, due to the decisive role played by intellectu-
als in the Low Countries in Cartesian philosophy joining the main stream of contempo-
rary philosophical reflections. 
Now let us turn to the Foreword of his Autobiography, written more than 40 years after 
having finished his university studies! I divide my paper into four parts. First, I present 
Bethlen’s mechanical interpretation of speech acts; it follows the discussion of the influ-
ence of Pufendorf ’s teaching about moral entities on Bethlen’s conception of common 
wealth. Thirdly, I will touch on the function of shame within and outside the positive 
state of political community and introduce Bethlen’s ideas concerning the religious in-
clinations of humans as the basis of natural law. Last, but not least, I will highlight some 
questions and problems which emerge in the constellation of these seemingly divergent 
topics in Bethlen’s text. 
I will not discuss philological problems. I will quote Bethlen’s text according to my 
own research to reconstruct an ultima manus version of his Foreword, which in some cases 
proves to be different from the formulations of the standard modern edition (cf. Simon 
2016b). For the English version I follow Bernard Adam’s translation published in London 
in 2004,6 but I made emendations of some passages relevant to our topic. 
Mechanism of Speech Acts
According to Bethlen, we are living in a physical world which is mechanical in its entire 
nature. He accepts many of Descartes’ teachings, such as the threefold division of corpus-
cular particles as developed in The Principles of Philosophy.7 There are minds merged into 
mechanical bodies, or at least we anticipate the existence of immaterial souls while perceiv-
ing social behaviour and speech acts of others. However, our anticipation turns out to be 
false most of the time. Bethlen is deeply convinced that social behaviour and communica-
tive speech acts can be generally described in a mechanical way. This means that ordinary 
cases of behaviour in everyday life lack consciousness. One is subjected to various physical 
effects in a society, to which he or she gives automatic responses without being conscious 
6 The Autobiography of Miklós Bethlen, transl. by Bernard Adams, London, Kegan Paul, 2004.
7 Descartes AT VIII/1, 80–202, passim, esp. 103–15. 
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of it. This also holds in the special case of communicative speech acts. In sharp contradic-
tion to Descartes intention,8 Bethlen claims that most cases of speech performances in 
a society prove to be mechanical and are not indubitable signs of the existence and opera-
tion of immaterial mind (Bethlen 1980, 434–6). 
Does not even the simplest of men experience this within himself; if his mind is 
fixed on something, he knows nothing about whatever he may hear or see apart 
from that which he then perceives. Indeed, he often does not know whether or not 
he has said that to which his tongue is accustomed; he may say a prayer or whatever, 
but his mind is far away. Sometimes he will even speak to another and answer, but 
he will not know of it when questioned later, and it will merely seem like a familiar 
dream that comes to mind. This everyone may experience best of all in church, dur-
ing divine service, when repeating a prayer after the priest or listening to a sermon; 
if one’s soul is far away one will know nothing of what one’s tongue is saying or 
one’s ears are hearing, but one will be perfectly well aware of that which one’s mind 
has perceived. (Bethlen 1980, 434; 2004, 52)
Bethlen’s example of the automatically praying man whose mind is intended to an entirely 
other object than the expressed content and whose mind directs the bodily organs for per-
forming speech act without consciousness probably follows Claude Cleselier’s Preface to the 
Paris edition of Descartes’ De l’ homme in 1664. There are several problems concerning this 
account of unconscious use of language. Without going into details,9 for the purpose of 
the present paper it is enough to cognise that Bethlen’s treatment of the topic depends on 
Cartesian discussions in France and in the Netherlands of the 1660s and 1670s. 
Pufendorfian Moral Entities10
Let’s take a new point of departure! Bethlen develops a theory of reputation, esteem11 and 
honour in a community. Members of a society always evaluate themselves and others, al-
ways make judgements of their own or of other’s good or bad deeds, intentions and behav-
8 Descartes AT VI, 57–59.
9 See my interpretation, Simon 2017.
10 Cf. Dreitzel 2001, 779–81 and Heikki Haara’s contribution to the present volume! 
11 The Hungarian equivalent for Pufendorfian existimatio is hírnév, a compound word from hír (rumour, 
news) and név (name). Consequently, Bethlen divides his definition of esteem into two parts following 
the structure of the Hungarian compound. Bethlen’s definition of name as a linguistic unit focuses on 
its communicative character instead of treating it primarily as an expression of mental content. The 
mechanical structure of a word as sign is determined by its communicative effectivity. On the other 
hand, communicative effectivity is made responsible for creating Pufendorfian civil and moral entities 
by Bethlen. 
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iour respectively. By doing so they can judge correctly or commit errors – paradigmatically 
we cannot even make appropriate judgments of our own behaviour, that is, we esteem our-
selves erroneously. However, whether these evaluations are correct or not, reputation and 
esteem produce special social entities, which Bethlen calls moral or civic qualities (quali-
tates morales sive civiles; Bethlen 1980, 410). Bethlen speaks about qualities that legitimate 
political authority, that make the representants of different kinds of practical knowledge 
to be honoured in a society and that construct relationships within families. The idea is 
clearly Pufendorfian in its origin, especially as Bethlen emphasises the ontological efficacy 
of these qualities (“they can become real and acts affecting men” – Bethlen 1980, 411; 
Bethlen 2004, 26). It is important to note that Bethlen is aware of the Pufendorfian prin-
ciple that esteem itself is not a civil or moral quality, but it produces civil and moral quali-
ties. As mentioned above, Bethlen refers laconically to the young Pufendorf ’s lectures on 
Grotius, which he attended in Heidelberg in the year 1661 (Bethlen 1980, 573). The theory 
concerning the ontological status of moral entities was already involved in the 1660 publi-
cation of the German scholar’s Elements of Jurisprudence (Böhling 2014, 10–2).12 Bethlen’s 
use of Pufendorf ’s theory is quite loose. While alluding to specific moral qualities imposed 
on things and persons by esteem and speech performances, Bethlen does not refer to the 
general concept of moral entities, of which moral qualities are only but one type besides 
moral state, moral substances and moral quantities. Without making it explicit, he seems 
to accept that there is a moral state of humans imposed on physical space, in which moral 
substances are imposed on physical bodies. 
Now, with the connection of both the respects of mechanical interpretation of speech 
acts and the ontology of moral entities, we arrive at a very strange point that cannot be 
found in Pufendorf. Namely, Bethlen stresses that speech acts play a crucial role in the 
genesis and reality of moral qualities. Against this background, esteem and honour are 
paradigmatically results of unconscious verbal interactions in society; therefore they can 
be described in a mechanical way as well.13 
12 Cf. Dreitzel’s note that the doctrine of entia moralia grew out of Pufendorf ’s “Auseinandersetzung” 
with Erhard Weigel’s “specific Cartesianism” (Dreitzel 2001, 780). On the relationship between Weigel 
and the young Pufendorf, cf. Wolfgang Röd’s classic summary: Röd 1969.
13 In this sense my interpretation stands very close to what Haara and Lahdenranta call “sentimentalism”: 
“By sentimentalism, we mean a metaethical view that takes moral qualities to be constituted by human 
judgements which either are or have their basis in emotional responses.” (Haara-Lahdenranta 2018, 22) 
Bethlen’s specific contribution to the relationship between moral-civil qualities and human judgments 
consists in the incorporation of the Cartesian dilemma of (un)consciousness of speech acts.
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Shame Within and Outside of Community 
Bethlen introduces the topic of shame as follows: 
From these [i.e. from one’s esteem/honour from the perspective of others – JS] 
there arise and born naturally in a man two things: amibitio or generositas, gloriae 
cupido, which is the desire for favourable judgement upon him; and shame, dis-
grace, pudor, which is fear and horror of unfavourable judgement. (Bethlen 1980, 
413; 2004, 28)
Shame and ambition14 are emotions which reflect on intersubjective esteem and honour 
among people. Shame is a reflective prolongation of mechanical structure of social qualities 
on the level of emotions, its aim is a kind of emotional management of social esteem; that 
is, a strategy to avoid actions which result in negative evaluations of others in my direction. 
However, shame as one’s psychological disposition does not depend on whether the evalu-
ative judgment is correct or false. May my fellows in a society make a false judgement of 
my intended act, I will intend not to perform the act in question, that is I will feel shame 
to do so as if the expected evaluations of my fellows in a society were right. The certainty 
of my conscience’s eventually correct judgement about myself is not so strong as it were 
able to eliminate my natural felt shame caused by the expected unfavourable judgement of 
others, even if this latter is false. The same with ambition: Even if the morsel of conscience 
informs me correctly concerning the evilness of my planned act in the future, I will intend 
to perform it ambitiously, because of the expected favourable judgment of others in society. 
The efficacy of shame and ambition in a community presupposes a general view of the 
sociality of human beings. Despite all the similarities of Bethlen’s theory concerning repu-
tation, esteem and honour with Pufendorf ’s teaching, the Hungarian thinker builds his 
interpretation of society on motifs other than those of his professor in Heidelberg. Bethlen 
explains the basic feature of the sociality of humans in terms of their shared anthropological 
standard of religious inclinations. Paraphrasing the Ciceronian-Senecan consensus argument 
in the manner of Gerhard Vossius (Vossius 1668, 1–2) and Herbert of Cherbury (Herbert 
of Cherbury 1663, 2), Bethlen establishes a general leaning towards religious behaviour 
in all nations (Bethlen 1980, 427–432; 2004, 45–50). He introduces three moments as 
anthropological standards and builds an idea of natural religion on it: 1) natural inclina-
tion towards esteem and honour even after one’s death, 2) belief in God and 3) conscience. 
God implanted these “qualities or inclinations” in man through nature – the anthropologi-
cal weight of these natural features is so strong that even original sin could not extinguish 
or modify them. They are also present in all pagan nations, who “prefer to worship stones, 
trees, reptiles or frogs than to be without a God to whom to turn in time of need” (Bethlen 
14 For the prevalence of shame and ambition as emotional constituencies of Pufendorfian human social-
ity, cf. Haara 2018, 99–136! 
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1980, 427; 2004, 45). However, Bethlen did not follow the typical procedure of compara-
tive studies of religions of his time: instead of describing different religions in the light of 
their worships of physical objects, the argumentation focuses on intersubjective relations 
resulting from speech performances in a social context. It follows consequently from the 
basic religious feature of mankind that none of the nations lacks and lacked social phenom-
ena depending on speech acts: “[t]here is no nation on earth in which there is not worship, 
oath-taking, blessing, cursing [átok], reproach [szitok], some slight modesty, glory, outrage, 
reward and punishment” (Bethlen 1980, 427; 2004, 45). Therefore, Bethlen embeds Pufen-
dorfian civil and moral constituents of society into a theory of natural religion. 
But one may suppose that these latter phenomena exist only under the circumstances 
of a positive state of commonwealth: “Now let us suppose that glory, outrage, reward and 
punishment are entirely human inventions for the maintenance of society.” (Bethlen 1980, 
427; 2004, 45) Bethlen expresses the volatile and unstable feature of these social emotions 
through describing reproach as “the blazing up the angry heart, as it were the burning of 
a sooty chimney” (Bethlen 1980, 427). Here, we have the idea discussed above: inclination 
to glory is ambition towards expecting reward and esteem because of acting in accordance 
with the interest of the common good, or as Bethlen has it “maintaining of society”. Out-
rage, on the other hand, is punishment for violation of the interest of the common good. 
May these emotions have their origin deep in human nature, the content of the common 
good directing them in a social context proves to be contingent in its very nature, or as 
Bethlen writes: they “are entirely human inventions for the maintenance of society”. But 
mere fear of punishment in the case of violating the common good cannot account per-
fectly for feeling shame; and hope of reward in the case of acting in accordance with the 
common good cannot account perfectly for keeping promises in oath-taking. 
 
Would there be worship, oath-taking, blessing and cursing if man did not believe 
in God, who has the power and the will, if you pray, to listen and come to your 
aid; to punish him that swears falsely; to implement blessing and cursing? For 
surely everyman knows that that is all merely words, the motion of the tongue and 
the air, and if there is none to give it power it is all futility and the wind bears it 
away. Would he that swears have any regard for that, or he to whom he swears, he 
that blesses or curses or those to whom these are directed? would they make use 
of them? would they fear them? if they had no faith of them. Would the powerful 
man who fears no punishment blush and feel ashamed where no one can see him, 
if his conscience did not prick him? (Bethlen 1980, 427–428; 2004, 45)
While leaving the positive social context behind, Bethlen arrives at the domain of natu-
ral laws. Bethlen appeals to God as the condition of causal efficacy of speech acts like 
oath-taking, blessing or cursing. However, it does not mean that the interpretation of 
their normativity beyond the positive legal state relies on supernatural moments of belief. 
Inclination towards pursuing glory or inclination towards avoiding shameful actions are 
natural endowments of mankind. Addressing the Hobbesian figure of the powerful in the 
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natural state, Bethlen declares that he feels shame even if knowledge of society, negative 
evaluation and the prospect of punishment for violating the common good are suspended. 
Therefore, shame proves to be not only an emotional management of esteem and honour 
in a community, but an emotion which mirrors a non-conventional, natural order of 
values. In this sense, shame has a strong connection to conscience. Even if Bethlen intro-
duced conscience as a natural facility of humans with theistic origin without the condi-
tion of revealed religion, one might ask whether feeling shame beyond and independently 
of the conventional positive state of a community has its origin in the anthropological 
standard of original sin. 
Bethlen, being a convinced Calvinist, is aware of this challenge of Augustinian theolo-
gical anthropology, and addresses the relationship between shame and original sin directly:
From that it is immediately apparent that the words of Moses are no fabula, and 
clothing is Adam’s invention not only against warm or cool but also against shame. 
[…] In vain and falsely have certain atheists and profaners postulated that Moses 
and others like him wished to obtain honour for themselves, domination over oth-
ers and the obedience of the simple, and therefore invented God, the soul, heaven, 
hell etc. (Bethlen 1980, 428; 2004, 45–46)
One should not be misguided by Bethlen’s apology of Mosaic narration against allegedly 
atheistic or profane interpretations.15 His vision of the relationship between shame and 
original sin is entirely rational and that of Enlightenment. It is not the Mosaic law which 
provides us with a theological interpretation of natural shame, but it is the rational theory 
of naturally felt shame which justifies the truth of the inspired Mosaic narration of Adam’s 
fall. In other words: we do not feel shame beyond social conventions because we are heirs 
of the theologically established original sin, but we as Christians inherit original sin be-
cause we, similar to representants of other confessions, are naturally ashamed to perform 
some acts. Bethlen explores a thin area for shame as natural emotion between the robust 
interpretative perspectives of social psychology and theological anthropology. He does not 
deny that one may feel shame because he or she experiences dishonour from his or her 
fellow citizens, and he does not rule out the possibility that one has bad conscience while 
feeling shame. But it is rather the natural emotion of shame, which allows for shame as an 
individual strategy for avoiding dishonour in society, as well as for upholding the truth of 
the Mosaic narrative of Adam’s feeling shame after the Fall. 
At this point, we can contrast Bethlen’s formulations with Pufendorf ’s ideas again. 
The German scholar addresses the problem of deduction of natural laws’ normativity from 
15 For a defence of natural law theory against atheism, cf. DJN, 3,4,4 (Pufendorf 1672, 312–4). Pufend-
orf ’s main target is Hobbes’s discussion of the atheist position, according to which there is no system 
of natural values that the atheist could violate. Therefore, Hobbes maintains that atheists do not violate 
natural law, but commit the error of ignorance and must be punished according to the jurisdiction of 
war instead of natural law. 
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theologically established shame in Elements of Jurisprudence, Book 1, definition 12, para-
graph 15 directly.
Now there is controversy among the learned about the strength of obligation in 
pacts which have been formed by the law of nature alone, such as exist among 
those who acknowledge no common judge in a human forum, or about which the 
civil law makes no disposition. For some have maintained that the efficacy of such 
pacts consists in a bond of shame and modesty [pudoris ac verecundiae vinculo] 
alone, especially where no agreement [συνάλλαγμα] has as yet interceded and noth-
ing has been furnished by either side, while the rest harshly criticize this opinion 
as weakening the trustworthiness of all treaties.
To us it seems that the matter is not so difficult if it is initially supposed that men 
have been fashioned by nature to cultivate society among themselves, and that no 
one should inflict on another that which can furnish a cause for discords and wars 
[…] it is quite apparent that men are altogether obligated by the law of nature to 
observe their pacts and that those who violate them sin against it [...] .16 (Pufen-
dorf 1994, 55)
Pufendorf 's idea of sociability as an anthropological standard of mankind makes the 
normative function of shame for acting in accordance with the natural law unnecessary. 
Bethlen does not admit human sociability even in its Pufendorfian version of ability to im-
pose moral entities upon physical states of affairs and to be aware of natural values originat-
ing from these impositions. He insists on the normative function of shame for respecting 
natural rights of others and disqualifies human rationality for recognising natural values. 
Bethlen seems to occupy a third position within Pufendorfian-Hobbesian ramification 
of social norms. He accepts the Pufendorfian theory of civil entities and ascribes causal 
efficacy to them in a society; but this latter ability of introducing physical and mental 
changes in the world is bound to the mediation of psychological states and speech acts in 
human beings. Bethlen’s sensitivity to psychological aspects of social norms and limiting 
the consciousness of speech acts converges in a Hobbesian direction, although the English 
thinker would have accepted neither Bethlen’s vision of universal normativity of naturally 
felt shame in the natural state of humans, nor the religious syncretism built on it. 
16 Latin and Greek insertions from Pufendorf 1660, 106–7. Cf. Pufendorf 1686, chapter 5, paragraph 5, 
276–7. 
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Summary and Problems
There are some puzzling moments and problems in Bethlen’s discussion of the relation-
ship between shame, commonwealth and religion. If we accept Bethlen’s view of shame 
as a reflective psychological management concerning acquiring esteem in a positive state 
of community, the religious aspect of shame proves to be problematic. According to the 
Hungarian author, natural religion (as a common and latent background behind all con-
fessions) is based on a natural inclination towards reputation, esteem and honour – besides 
a reductive knowledge of God and the presence of conscience. The link between social and 
natural shame remains unexplained in the Foreword of the Autobiography. For maintain-
ing natural shame outside human community, Bethlen should extend the relevance of 
Pufandorfian moral qualities to the realm of the natural state of humans as well. Bethlen 
seems to substitute natural – or as Pufendorf describes it, simple – esteem with the basic 
drive for religious behaviour in the human natural state. Furthermore, as Bethlen makes 
esteem strongly dependent on speech acts in the social context, he should treat the problem 
of use of language in the natural state, too. Are communicative performances in most cases 
unconscious in the natural state of humans as well, or is the mind aware of the contents of 
speech in the state of nature while producing natural moral qualities? There are some signs 
towards this latter direction, but this step is in no way explicit in Bethlen’s text. The lack 
of this connection is crucial for his theory, because he seems to base natural religion on 
a natural inclination towards esteem. 
But one thing is clear. Despite all the inconsequencies, we might suppose in Bethlen’s 
application of Pufendorf ’s theory of moral qualities a deep understanding of the problems 
concerning human community. The gap between moral qualities and natural religion as 
explanatory ideas for human sociality is abridged by Bethlen’s introduction of the Car-
tesian problem of the mind’s transparency concerning speech acts. In Bethlen’s vision of 
society, Pufendorfian imposition is driven through religious inclinations of human nature 
on the basis of mechanical speech performances. However, Pufendorf had no interest in 
embedding his theory of imputation into the problems of the Cartesian philosophy of 
mind. Likewise, prominent protagonists of Cartesianism who subscribed to the possibil-
ity of unconscious speech acts (such as Claude Clerselier (Clerselier 1664, oo iir–v), Jean 
Darmanson (Darmanson 1684, 62) or Jean-Baptiste Duhamel (Duhamel 1673, 89–90)), 
appeared to be entirely disinterested in the Pufendorfian enterprise of political philosophy. 
One possible way to bridge the gap between these tendencies can be found in Thomas 
Hobbes’s philosophy. There may have existed parallel phenomena in Pufendorf ’s Early 
Modern reception of Bethlen’s reformed Cartesian interpretation – above all in the Protes-
tant Low Countries and Germany – which should be explored in the future. 
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